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Abstract
While the µ-calculus notoriously subsumes Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL), we show
that the epistemic µ-calculus does not subsume ATL with imperfect information (ATLi), for
the synchronous perfect-recall semantics. To prove this we first establish that jumping parity
tree automata (JTA), a recently introduced extension of alternating parity tree automata, are
expressively equivalent to the epistemic µ-calculus, and this for any knowledge semantics. Using
this result we also show that, for bounded-memory semantics, the epistemic µ-calculus is not more
expressive than the standard µ-calculus, and that its satisfiability problem is Exptime-complete.
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1 Introduction
The propositional µ-calculus (Lµ) [12] is a logic of utmost importance in theoretical computer
science for several main reasons. First, it is a powerful logic that captures all ω-regular
properties that are used for the verification of dynamic systems’ behavioral properties. In
particular, it subsumes all classic temporal logics, such as LTL, CTL and CTL∗ [6]. Second,
it enjoys deep connections with several paradigms that play a fundamental role in modern
approaches for the verification of reactive systems: it is equivalent to alternating parity
automata [7, Chap. 10], a powerful tool to design decision procedures for temporal logics. Lµ
is also closely related with parity games, which are central both for modeling the interaction
of systems and for testing the satisfiability of temporal logics [7]. It can be used to specify
strategic abilities in multi-player games [16], and it subsumes logics of coalition and strategy
like the Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [1] and Strategy Logic [5]. Finally, its
connection with more classic logics is well understood as its expressive power coincides with
the bisimulation invariant fragment of the monadic second order logic (MSO) [11].
While most results concern the perfect information setting in which players/agents know
the actual state of the system, realistic applications led to consider agents that have to
strategize based on a partial information of their environment. This need gave rise to a
proliferation of frameworks to represent, reason about and/or strategize under imperfect
information. There are basically two trends. One trend relies on extensions of previous
strategic logics with additional constraints on strategic abilities of players, that forces them
to strategize consistently with their available information. This is the case of variants of
ATL with imperfect information like ATLi, ATLir, ATLK or ATEL [9, 20, 17] – to cite only
a few, see also [3] for a recent survey of the various logics of this type. The other trend is
based on extensions of temporal logics with epistemic features, sometimes also combined
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2 The Expressive Power of Epistemic µ-Calculus
with the concepts of the former. Such logics include Epistemic Temporal Logic [8], epistemic
mu-calculus LKµ , first introduced in [18], and the epistemic alternating mu-calculus AMC [4].
Comparing the two trends is necessary to share expertise, and it is relevant to wonder
whether LKµ has the same central position as the standard µ-calculus has in the perfect
information setting. Some results are already known: the epistemic µ-calculus subsumes
Epistemic Temporal Logic and Propositional Epistemic Dynamic Logic [18], and a notion of
Alternating Epistemic Mu-Calculus that considers one-step strategic abilities [4]. It is also
known from [4] that ATLi is not subsumed by this Alternating Epistemic Mu-Calculus for a
memoryless semantics with imperfect information.
Our contribution is threefold: first, we show that the epistemic µ-calculus has the same
expressive power as the recently introduced jumping automata, an extension of alternating
parity tree automata that allow for jumps between tree nodes [15]. The proof relies on the
classic result that the modal µ-calculus is equivalent with alternating tree automata [7]
Second, combining this general result with the fact that jumping automata equipped with
recognizable relations between tree nodes translate in linear time into two-way tree automata
[15], we obtain two corollaries: for bounded memory semantics, (1) LKµ is not more expressive
than Lµ, and (2) the satisfiability problem for LKµ is Exptime-complete.
Third, we prove that, unlike in the perfect information setting, ATLi is not subsumed
by the epistemic µ-calculus: we consider the formula 〈〈a〉〉Fp, which means that Alice has a
uniform strategy (i.e. a strategy consistent with her observations) to eventually reach p, and
we show that if a jumping automaton accepts all the (tree) models of this formula then it
also accepts another model in which Alice only has a non-uniform strategy to achieve Fp.
This result is proved for the synchronous and perfect recall semantics of indistinguishability.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, first we introduce basic notations and
we recall classic parity games as well as game bisimulations. We then expose the epistemic
µ-calculus, ATL with imperfect information, and jumping tree automata. In Section 3 we
prove that the epistemic µ-calculus is equivalent to jumping tree automata, from which we
derive corollaries on the expressivity and the complexity of LKµ with bounded memory. Using
again the correspondence between LKµ and jumping tree automata, we prove in Section 4
that ATL with imperfect information is not expressible in LKµ , and we conclude in Section 5,
where we also comment on the impact of the results on the relationship between the epistemic
µ-calculus and the monadic second order enriched with equal-level predicate (see e.g. [19]).
2 Preliminaries
In this section we set some notations concerning infinite trees and parity games, and we
recall the definitions of the three main objects considered in this paper: epistemic µ-calculus,
ATL with imperfect information, and jumping tree automata.
A tree is a nonempty set τ ⊆ N∗such that if x · i ∈ τ , then x ∈ τ and x.j ∈ τ for all j < i,
and if x ∈ τ , there exists i ∈ N such that x · i ∈ τ , and if x.i. The elements of τ are called
nodes, and the empty word  is the root of the tree. If x · i ∈ τ , x · i is a child of x. The arity
of a node x is its number of children, and if every node of some tree t has arity at most k, τ
is a k-ary tree. Given a node x of a tree τ , we let Pathsτ (x) (or simply Paths(x)) be the
set of infinite paths pi = x0x1 . . . in τ such that x0 = x and for all i, xi+1 is a child of xi.
Also, for a path pi = x0x1 . . . we let pi[i] := xi. For two nodes x and y, y is a descendent of
x (written x  y) if x is a prefix of y, or equivalently if y can be found on some path that
starts in x. We denote by τ ↓x the subtree of τ rooted in x: τ ↓x= {y | x  y}.
Trees may be labelled with atomic propositions from a countably infinite set AP that
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we fix. For a finite subset AP ⊂ AP of atomic propositions, an AP -tree is a pair t = (τ, `),
where τ is a tree and ` : τ → 2AP is a labelling of the nodes. A node x in a tree is reached by
a finite prefix ρ of a path in Paths(), say ρx = x0 . . . xn with xn = x. We define the word
of x, written w(x), by `()`(x1) . . . `(xn).
For simplicity, we may write x ∈ t instead of x ∈ τ . Finally, if t = (τ, `) is an AP -
tree, p ∈ AP and S ⊆ τ , we define t[p → S] as the (AP ∪ {p})-tree t′ = (τ, `′), where
`′(x) = `(x) ∪ {p} if x ∈ S, and `(x) \ {p} otherwise. In other words, t[p→ S] is the same
tree as t, except that we make p hold exactly on nodes in S.
2.1 Parity games and game bisimulation
We define two-player turn-based parity games, that we use to define acceptance of trees by
parity tree automata. We also define game bisimulations, recently introduced in [2].
Fix an alphabet Σ. For an infinite word w = a0a1 . . . ∈ Σω and i ≥ 0, we let w[i] := ai
and w[0, i] := a0a1 . . . ai. For a finite word u = a0 . . . an−1 ∈ Σ∗, its length is |u| := n.
We define two-player turn-based parity games: A parity game arena is a tuple G =
(V,E,C), where V is a set of positions partitioned between positions of Eve (VE) and those
of Adam (VA). Binary relation E ⊆ V × V is a set of moves that we assume total, i.e. for
all v ∈ V , there is v′ ∈ V such that (v, v′) ∈ E. Finally, C : V → N is a colouring function.
A parity game G = (G, v0) is a game arena G = (V,E,C) together with an initial position
v0 ∈ V . Given a parity game G = (G, v0), a play pi ∈ V ω is an infinite sequence of positions
such that pi[0] = v0, and for all i ≥ 0, (pi[i], pi[i+1]) ∈ E. A partial play ρ = v0 . . . vn ∈ V ∗ is a
finite prefix of a play and it ends in vn. A strategy σ for Eve is a partial function σ : V ∗ → V
such that for all partial play ρ ending in v ∈ VE , σ(ρ) is defined and (v, σ(ρ)) ∈ E. A play pi
follows a strategy σ if for all i ≥ 0 such that pi[i] ∈ VE , pi[i+ 1] = σ(pi[0, i]), and similarly for
partial plays. For a parity game G and a strategy σ for Eve in G, we denote by Out(G, σ)
the set of outcomes of σ, that is plays in G that follow σ. A play pi is winning for Eve if
the least colour seen infinitely often along pi is even, otherwise pi is winning for Adam. A
winning strategy for Eve is a strategy whose outcomes are all winning for Eve. Finally, as we
only consider winning strategies of Eve, we say that position v of a game arena G is winning
if Eve has a winning strategy in (G, v).
Berwanger and Kaiser introduce in [2] a notion of bisimulation between parity games and
they prove that two bisimilar games are equivalent with regards to the existence of winning
strategies 1. This result will be crucial to establish our nonexpressivity result in Section 4.
I Definition 1. Let G = (V,E,C) and G′ = (V ′, E′, C ′) be two game arenas. A bisimulation
between G and G′ is a binary relation Z ⊆ V × V ′ such that:
Colour Harmony: for all (v, v′) ∈ Z, C(v) = C ′(v′),
Zig: for all (v, v′) ∈ Z, if there is u ∈ V such that (v, u) ∈ E, then there is u′ ∈ V ′ such that
(v′, u′) ∈ E′ and (u, u′) ∈ Z, and
Zag: for all (v, v′) ∈ Z, if there is u′ ∈ V ′ such that (v′, u′) ∈ E′, then there is u ∈ V such
that (v, u) ∈ E and (u, u′) ∈ Z.
For initial positions v0 ∈ V and v′0 ∈ V ′, we say that (G, v0) is bisimilar to (G′, v′0), written
G, v0 - G′, v′0, if there is a bisimulation Z between G and G′ such that (v0, v′0) ∈ Z.
I Proposition 2 ([2]). For two game arenas G and G′, and two respective positions v and
v′, if G, v - G′, v′, then v is winning in (G, v) if and only if v′ is winning in (G′, v′).
1 Note that in [2] the definitions are more general and consider games with imperfect information.
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2.2 Epistemic µ-calculus
We fix Var = {X,Y, . . .} a countably infinite set of second order variables. Given a finite set
of agents Ag, the syntax of the epistemic µ-calculus LKµ is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= X | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 3ϕ | Kiϕ | µX.ϕ(X)
where X ∈ Var, p ∈ AP, i ∈ Ag, and in the last rule X appears only positively (under an
even number of negations) in ϕ(X). For a finite set of atomic propositions AP ⊂ AP, we
denote by LKµ (AP,Ag), or simply LKµ when the parameters are irrelevant, the set of formulas
of the epistemic µ-calculus that only use atomic propositions in AP and agents in Ag.
A model of a formula in LKµ (AP,Ag) consists in an AP -tree t together with a set of
binary relations {;i}i∈Ag over (2AP )∗. In the following, for two nodes x and y in t, x;i y
stands for w(x) ;i w(y): two nodes are related by ;i if their node words are related by ;i.
Intuitively, x;i y means that when the current node is x, Agent i considers possible (up to
her knowledge) that node y is the current node. Notice that the relation ;i is arbitrary and
not necessarily an equivalence relation, as often assumed in epistemic logic. From now on,
whenever Ag is clear from the context, {;} will denote a relation profile {;i}i∈Ag. Finally,
interpreting a formula requires a valuation V : Var → 2t; also, given X ∈ Var and S ⊆ t,
V [S/X] is the valuation that maps X to S, and is equal to V on all other variables.
The semantics of a formula ϕ ∈ LKµ (AP,Ag) on an AP -tree t = (τ, `) with relation profile
{;} and valuation V is the set of nodes JϕKtV ⊆ t defined as follows:
• JXKtV = V (X) • JpKtV = {x ∈ t | p ∈ `(x)}
• J¬ϕKtV = t \ JϕKtV • Jϕ ∨ ψKtV = JϕKtV ∪ JψKtV
• J3ϕKtV = {x ∈ t | x · i ∈ JϕKtV for some i ∈ [k]}
• JKiϕKtV = {x ∈ t | y ∈ JϕKtV for all y such that x;i y}
• JµX.ϕ(X)KtV = ⋂{S ⊆ t | Jϕ(X)KtV [S/X] ⊆ S}
Classically, for each formula µX.ϕ(X) in LKµ , the fact that X appears only positively in ϕ(X)
ensures that S 7→ Jϕ(X)KtV [S/X] is a monotone function, and hence that its least fixpoint
exists. JµX.ϕ(X)KtV is defined to be this fixpoint.
If ϕ ∈ LKµ is a sentence, i.e. it has no free variables, its semantics is independent on the
valuation, that we may omit from the semantics. For a sentence ϕ ∈ LKµ , a relation profile {;}
and a tree t, we write t, {;} |= ϕ for  ∈ JϕKt{;}, and we let L(ϕ, {;}) := {t | t, {;},  |= ϕ}.
Finally, we let Lµ denote the sublanguage of LKµ obtained by removing the modalities Ki, and
simply write t,  |= ϕ as relation profile do not play any role in the semantics of Lµ-formulas;
thus, for ϕ ∈ Lµ we may use L(ϕ) = {t | t,  |= ϕ}.
2.3 Alternating-time Temporal Logic with imperfect information
We now recall the syntax and semantics of Alternating-time Temporal Logic with imperfect
information (ATLi). Again, let Ag be a nonempty finite set of agents. The syntax of ATLi(Ag)
is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉Xϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕUϕ
where p ∈ AP and A ⊆ Ag.
The semantics of ATLi is usually defined on concurrent game structures (see [1]). These
are transition systems with states labelled by valuations over some finite set of propositions
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AP , and where every transition is labelled by a compound action a = (a1, . . . , ak), which
is interpreted as Agent i ∈ Ag playing action ai during this transition. The imperfect
information is usually introduced by letting each agent observe only a subset of AP , and
by deciding whether agents remember the past during a play or not. This induces, for each
agent, an equivalence relation between finite plays.
In order to make the comparison with epistemic µ-calculus easier, we instead define the
semantics of ATLi on what we call tree-arenas:
I Definition 3. Let AP ⊂ AP be a finite set of atomic propositions, and for each i ∈ Ag,
let Acti be a nonempty finite set of actions available to Agent i. Define Act :=×i∈AgActi,
and let AP act := {pa | a ∈ Act} where each pa is an atomic proposition not in AP . An
(AP,Act)-tree-arena is an (AP ∪AP act)-tree t = (τ, `) such that `() ∩AP act = ∅, and for
all x ∈ τ \ {}, `(x) ∩AP act is a singleton.
For the rest of this section, we fix a finite set AP ⊂ AP and a finite set of actions Acti
for each agent i ∈ Ag. For an (AP,Act)-tree-arena t = (τ, `) and a node x ∈ τ , we write
`(x) = (v, a), where a ∈ Act is the unique (compound) action such that pa ∈ `(x), and
v = `(x) \ {pa}. In addition, given a = (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ Act, ai will denote ai. Note that a
tree-arena t can be seen as a concurrent game structure: take a node x ∈ t, and let (v, a) be
its label. Node x can be seen as a state of a transition system, v as its label, and a as the
label of the only transition reaching x. Concerning the imperfect information, similarly to the
previous section, we introduce agents’ uncertainty by means of binary relations {;i}i∈Ag over
(2AP∪APact)∗. Conversely, the unfolding of every concurrent game structure with imperfect
information can be seen as a tree-arena equipped with a relation profile. We now adapt the
classic semantics of ATL to our setting.
First we need a few more definitions. Fix an (AP,Act)-tree-arena t and a relation profile
{;}. A strategy for Agent i is a function σi : t→ Acti, that defines the strategic choice of
Agent i in each possible situation. Because agents have imperfect information, we classically
require strategies to be consistent with the information of the agent: if σi is a strategy for
Agent i, we require that for each x, y ∈ t such that x;i y, σi(x) = σi(y) (note that strategies
satisfying this requirement are sometimes called uniform strategies [10]). For A ⊆ Ag, we
call A-profile a tuple σA = (σi)i∈A where σi is a strategy for Agent i, and given an A-profile
σA and i ∈ A, we let σiA denote the strategy of agent i in σA. The outcome of an A-profile
σA for some A ⊆ Ag is the set of behaviours that follow the strategies in the profile, defined
as follows. For a node x of t, Out(x, σA) ⊆ Paths(x) is the set of paths pi in t that start in x
and such that for all k ≥ 0, if (v, a) is the label of pi[k + 1], then σiA(pi[k]) = ai for all i ∈ A.
The semantics of an ATLi-formula ϕ with atomic propositions in AP is given with respect
to an (AP,Act)-tree-arena t = (τ, `), a relation profile {;} and a node x ∈ t:
• t, {;}, x |= p if p ∈ v, where (v, a) = `(x)
• t, {;}, x |= ¬ϕ if t, {;}, x 6|= ϕ
• t, {;}, x |= ϕ ∨ ψ if t, {;}, x |= ϕ or t, {;}, x |= ψ
• t, {;}, x |= 〈〈A〉〉Xϕ if there is an A-profile σA such that:
for all y ∈ t, if x;i y for some i ∈ A, then for all pi ∈ Out(y, σA),
t, {;}, pi[1] |= ϕ
• t, {;}, x |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ if there is an A-profile σA such that:
for all y ∈ t, if x;i y for some i ∈ A, then for all pi ∈ Out(y, σA),
there is i ≥ 0 such that t, {;}, pi[i] |= ψ, and for all 0 ≤ j < i, t, {;}, pi[j] |= ϕ
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We define the following classic shorthands: > := p ∨ ¬p, and 〈〈A〉〉Fϕ := 〈〈A〉〉>Uϕ.
Finally, for a formula ϕ ∈ ATLi, a set of (compound) actions Act and a relation profile {;},
we let L(ϕ,Act, {;}) := {t | t is a (Free(ϕ),Act)-tree-arena s.t. t, {;},  |= ϕ}.
I Remark. We consider here the most restrictive notion of “having a strategy”, i.e. having a
strategy “de re” [10]. However, the result that we prove in Section 4 still holds with less
restrictive notions of strategies: “de dicto” strategies, or simply uniform strategies
2.4 Jumping tree automata
Jumping tree automata (JTA) were introduced in [15, 14]. Let Ag be a finite set of agents.
For a set X, B+(X) is the set of positive boolean formulas over X, i.e. formulas built with
elements of X as atomic propositions and using only connectives ∨ and ∧. We also allow for
formulas > and ⊥, and ∧ has precedence over ∨. Elements of B+(X) are denoted by α, β . . .
I Definition 4. Let Dir = {3,} ∪⋃i∈Ag{ ; i, ;i} be the set of automaton directions. A
jumping automaton is a tuple A = (AP,Q, δ, q0, C) where AP ⊂ AP is a finite set of atomic
propositions, Q a finite set of states, q0 ∈ Q an initial state, C : Q→ N a colouring function,
and δ : Q× 2AP → B+(Dir ×Q) a transition function.
Let A be a JTA over AP . The meaning of the jump directions ; i, ;i is given by a
relation profile {;} = {;i}i∈Ag, where for each i, ;i⊆ (2AP )∗× (2AP )∗. The acceptance of
an input tree t = (τ, `) by A equipped with a relation profile {;} is defined on a two-player
parity game between Eve (the proponent) and Adam (the opponent): let t = (τ, `) be an
AP -tree, and let A = (Σ, Q, δ, q0, C). We define the game GAt,{;} = (V,E,C ′, v0): the set of
positions is V = τ ×Q×B+(Dir ×Q), the initial position is (, q0, δ(q0, `())), and a position
(x, q, α) belongs to Eve if α is of the form α1 ∨ α2, [3, q′] or [ ; i, q′]; otherwise it belongs to
Adam. The possible moves in GAt,{;} are the following:
(x, q, α1 † α2)→ (x, q, αi) where † ∈ {∨,∧} and i ∈ {1, 2} (1)
(x, q, [#, q′])→ (y, q′, δ(q′, `(y))) where # ∈ {3,} and y is a child of x (2)
(x, q, [;i, q′])→ (y, q′, δ(q′, `(y))) where ;i ∈ { ; i, ;i} and x;i y (3)
Positions of the form (x, q,>) and (x, q,⊥) are deadlocks, winning for Eve and Adam
respectively. The colouring function C ′ of GAt,{;} is inherited from the one of A: C ′(x, q, α) =
C(q). A tree t is accepted by A with relation profile {;} if Eve has a winning strategy in
GAt,{;}, and we denote by L(A, {;}) the set of trees accepted by A equipped with relation
profile {;}. If A is an alternating automaton (i.e. it only uses automata directions 3 and
), it needs not be equipped by a relation profile to evaluate trees, and we write L(A) for
the set of trees it accepts.
I Remark. In general, JTA can identify children of a given current node and send different
copies independently to each one of them. This ability is not always needed, but quantifying
(existentially or universally) over children is sufficient. This is the case in this work, reason
why we have presented here a symmetric version of jumping tree automata, just like symmetric
alternating automata have sometimes been considered (see e.g. [13]).
In the following, the size of a formula ϕ, written |ϕ|, is its number of subformulas, and
the size of an automaton A, written |A|, is the size of its transition function (i.e. the sum of
the sizes of formulas occuring in it).
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3 Equivalence of jumping tree automata and epistemic µ-calculus
We show that JTA and LKµ are equally expressive, as stated by the following theorem.
I Theorem 5.
For every formula ϕ ∈ LKµ , there exists a jumping automaton Aϕ such that for every
relation profile {;}, L(ϕ, {;}) = L(Aϕ, {;}).
For every jumping automaton A, there exists an LKµ -formula ϕA such that for every
relation profile {;}, L(A, {;}) = L(ϕA, {;}).
Moreover, the translations are effective and linear.
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 5 and to two corollaries.
We rely on the classical equivalence between the multi-modal µ-calculus, written here Lµ,
and alternating tree automata, when interpreted over transition systems: A (multi-modal,
AP -labelled) transition system is a tuple S = (Q, {Ri}i∈I , V ), where Q is a set of states, I is
a finite set of indices, for each i ∈ I, Ri ⊆ Q×Q is a binary relation, and V : Q→ 2AP is a
labelling function. We do not detail the semantics of the µ-calculus and alternating automata
over transition systems, which is very similar to the one for trees (see [7, Chap. 10]).
I Proposition 6. [7, Chap. 9, Chap. 10]
For every formula ϕ ∈ Lµ, there exists an alternating automaton Aϕ that accepts precisely
the transition systems verifying ϕ.
For every alternating automaton A, there exists an Lµ-formula ϕA whose models are
exactly the transition systems accepted by A.
Moreover, the translations are effective and linear.
Now we make observation that AP -trees are connected, acyclic, rooted transition systems
with one relation. Also, an AP -tree t = (τ, `) together with a relation profile {;i}i∈Ag
over (2AP )∗ can be seen as a transition system S{;}t = (τ, {R} ∪ {Ri}i∈Ag, `), where xRy
if y is a child of x, and xRiy if x ;i y. For a relation profile {;}, we define CAP{;} :=
{S{;}t | t is an AP -tree}, the class of all transition systems obtained by combining {;}
with AP -trees. Now, two additional simple observations are necessary to prove Theorem 5:
(1) Given a relation profile {;}, an LKµ -formula on AP -trees can be seen as an Lµ-formula
on CAP{;}, and (2) A jumping automaton equipped with a relation profile {;} and working
on AP -trees can be seen as an alternating automaton working on CAP{;}.
We now argue for Theorem 5: For the first point, take a formula ϕ ∈ LKµ and a relation
profile {;}. See it as an Lµ-formula over CAP{;}. By Proposition 6, one can build in linear
time an alternating automaton Aϕ that has the same language as ϕ on transition systems,
and therefore also when restricted to CAP{;}. This Aϕ, when restricted to CAP{;}, can be seen as
a jumping automaton. Because Aϕ only depends on ϕ and not on {;}, we obtain the desired
result. The second point of Theorem 5 is just dealt by rolling back the above argumentation.
Theorem 5 has two important corollaries. First, let us recall some definitions and results
concerning recognizable relations and jumping automata. Let Σ be a finite alphabet.
I Definition 7. A relation ; ⊆ Σ∗ × Σ∗ is recognizable if there are two families of regular
languages U1, . . . ,Un ⊆ Σ∗ and U ′1, . . . ,U ′n ⊆ Σ∗ such that ; = n⋃
i=1
Ui × U ′i .
For example, epistemic relations of agents whose memory can be represented by finite
state machines are recognizable relations (see [14]).
8 The Expressive Power of Epistemic µ-Calculus
Given a recognizable relation ;, one easily shows that the language {w#w′ | w ; w′}
where # is a fresh symbol can be accepted by a finite-state word automaton; we let size of
;, written |; |, is then the number of states of a minimal word automaton that recognizes
the language {w#w′ | w ; w′}.
I Theorem 8. [15, 14] For every jumping automaton A equipped with a relation profile {;},
if every relation ;i in {;} is recognizable, then there is a two-way tree automaton A{;}
that accepts the same language, and such that |A{;}| is polynomial in |A|+ ∑
i∈Ag
|;i |.
Restricting attention to trees of bounded arity, we obtain the following two corollaries:
I Corollary 9. The satisfiability problem for epistemic µ-calculus with recognizable relations
is Exptime-complete.
Proof. The upper bound follows from Theorem 5 together with Theorem 8 and the fact that,
for trees of bounded arity, the emptiness problem for two-way tree automata is Exptime-
complete [21]. The hardness follows from EXPTIME-hardness of the satisfiability problem
for standard µ-calculus. J
I Corollary 10. Epistemic µ-calculus with recognizable relations is not more expressive than
(its fragment) the µ-calculus.
Proof. By Propositions 6, it suffices to show that for each epistemic µ-calculus formula ϕ
interpreted with recognizable relations, there exists an alternating tree automaton that accepts
the models of ϕ. Let ϕ ∈ LKµ , and let {;} be a relation profile of recognizable relations. By
Theorem 5, there exists a jumping automaton Aϕ such that L(Aϕ, {;}) = L(ϕ, {;}). Then,
by Theorem 8, there is a two-way tree automaton A{;}ϕ such that L(Aϕ, {;}) = L(A{;}ϕ ).
Finally, by [21], there is a non-deterministic (hence alternating) tree automaton B{;}ϕ such
that L(B{;}ϕ ) = L(A{;}ϕ ), which concludes. J
4 Inexpressivity
In this section we prove the non-expressibility of ATL with imperfect information within
the epistemic µ-calculus. We exhibit a formula of ATLi and a relation profile that has no
equivalent in the epistemic µ-calculus evaluated with the same relation profile.
Let AP = {p}, Ag = {a} and Acta = Act = {a0, a1}. We have AP act = {pa0 , pa1}.
Assume that Agent a is synchronous blindfold, i.e. she observes nothing but the occurence
of moves. Her indistinguishability relation on (AP,Act)-tree arenas is therefore ; ⊆
(2AP∪APact)∗, defined by w ; w′ if |w| = |w′|. Consider the formula 〈〈a〉〉Fp ∈ ATLi(Ag).
We prove that there is no formula of the epistemic µ-calculus that is equivalent to ϕ with
regards to the singleton relation profile {;}. More formally:
I Theorem 11. For all ϕ′ ∈ LKµ (AP ∪AP act,Ag), L(ϕ′,;) 6= L(〈〈a〉〉Fp,Act,;).
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 11.
Assume towards a contradiction that there is a formula ϕ′ ∈ LKµ (AP ∪AP act,Ag) such
that L(ϕ′,;) = L(〈〈a〉〉Fp,Act,;). By Theorem 5, there is a jumping automaton A such
that L(ϕ′,;) = L(A,;). Let A = (AP ∪AP act, Q, δ, q0, C), and let N = |Q|+ 1.
We build 2N tree-arenas in which the formula 〈〈a〉〉Fp holds. In each of them, the objective
Fp is attained with a different uniform strategy. We exhibit, for each tree, a winning strategy
in the acceptance game of A on that tree, and then we employ the “pigeon hole” principle to
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show that at least two of these strategies can be combined into a new strategy that accepts
a new tree-arena, in which the only strategy for a to ensure Fp is not uniform.
We describe the family of tree-arenas that we consider (see Figure 1). Concretely we only
describe finite trees, infinite trees are obtained by adding loops on leafs and unfolding the
obtained graphs. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , 2N}, the tree ti = (τi, `i) is such that:
1. The root does not verify p: `i() = ∅
2. In , Agent a can only play a0. Through this action she can move to 2N+2 different children.
The first 2N ones verify p, but not the last two ones. Formally, τi ∩ N = {0, . . . , 2N + 1}.
For readability, we call xm+1 the node m for each m ∈ {0, . . . , 2N + 1} (see Figure 1).
For 1 ≤ k ≤ 2N , `i(xk) = {p, pa0}, and for k ∈ {2N + 1, 2N + 2}, `i(xk) = {pa0}.
3. For 1 ≤ k ≤ 2N + 2, node xk has exactly one child yk = xk · 0 reachable through a0,
where p does not hold: for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2N + 2, `i(yk) = {pa0}.
4. For each k ≤ 2N + 2, the subtree ti ↓xk is a full binary tree of height N in which each
non-leaf node x  xk has a left child, accessed through a0, and a right child, accessed
through a1. The valuations are as follows. First, for the actions: for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2N + 2 and
w ∈ {0, 1}≤N , pac ∈ `i(yk · w), where c is the last letter of w. Now, for the proposition
p. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , 2N}, let wk ∈ {0, 1}N be the binary representation of k − 1.
For w ∈ {0, 1}≤N , if 1 ≤ k ≤ 2N , then p ∈ `i(yk · w) if and only if w = wk, and if
k ∈ {2N + 1, 2N + 2}, p ∈ `i(yk · w) if and only if w = wi.
Observe that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 2N}, ti and tj share the same underlying tree, that
we shall write τ : τi = τj = τ . Moreover, the labellings only differ on the leafs of τ ↓y2N+1
and τ ↓y2N+2 . Remark also that, since Agent a observes no atomic proposition, her uniform
strategies are simply (infinite) sequences of actions. Also, for each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N ,
Gi denotes GAti,{;}, the acceptance game of A on ti with relation ;.
I Lemma 12. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , 2N}, Eve has a winning strategy in Gi.
Proof. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , 2N}. Agent a has a uniform strategy in Gi for achieving Fp: it consists
in playing a0a0wiaω0 . Therefore ti,;,  |= 〈〈a〉〉Fp, hence ti ∈ L(A,;). This precisely means
that Eve has a winning strategy in Gi. J
Let us take one winning strategy σi for Eve in each game Gi. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N , we
define visitσi : τ → 2Q, which maps each node of τ to the set of states in which σi visits
this node: visitσi(x) := {q | ∃pi ∈ Out(σi),∃i ≥ 0,∃b ∈ B+(Dir × Q) s.t. pi[i] = (x, q, b)}.
Consider, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N , the set visitσi(y2N+1). Since there are at most 2|Q| different
such sets of states, and we have 2N strategies with N = |Q|+ 1, there must exist i 6= j s.t.
visitσi(y2N+1) = visitσj (y2N+1). For the rest of the proof we fix such a pair (i, j). We now
consider the tree-arena t0 that consists in ti where the subtree ti ↓y2N+1 is replaced with
tj ↓y2N+1 (see Figure 1). Let us write G0 for GAt0,{;}.
Observe that the three games Gi, Gj and G0 share the same set of positions: V 0 = V i =
V j = τ × Q × B+(Dir × Q) = V . Also, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ 2N + 2, `0(yk) = `i(yk) = `j(yk)
(= {pa0}), that we now write `. Because positions of the form (yk, q, δ(q, `)) play an important
role in the following, we let vqk := (yk, q, δ(q, `)).
We first establish the following crucial lemma, which allows us to transfer the existence
of winning strategies in positions vqk from Gi and Gj to G0 (see Appendix A for the proof).
I Lemma 13.
1. For all q ∈ Q, for k 6= 2N + 1, G0, vqk - Gi, vqk, and
2. for all q ∈ Q, for k 6= 2N + 2, G0, vqk - Gj , vqk.
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Figure 1 The tree ti, the tree tj , and the combined tree t0.
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Observe that, in t0, Agent a has a non-uniform strategy to achieve Fp, but no uniform
one. Therefore, t0,;,  6|= 〈〈a〉〉Fp, and thence t0 /∈ L(A,;). By definition of the acceptance
for jumping automata, Eve does not have a winning strategy in G0. We prove the following
proposition and obtain a contradiction, which terminates the proof of Theorem 11.
I Proposition 14. Eve has a winning strategy in G0.
Proof sketch. We give an intuition on how a winning strategy σ0 for Eve in G0 can be
obtained. The detail can be found in Appendix B. Let us define Startτ = {, x1, . . . , x2N+2},
the two first levels of τ , and StartG = {(x, q, α) ∈ V | x ∈ Startτ}. Observe that every play
in G0 starts in StartG , namely, in v0 = (, q0, δ(q0, `0())), and may remain in StartG for an
arbitrarily long time if it keeps jumping without going down. Otherwise, it exits StartG by
reaching some node yk, in position vqk for some q. Observe also that from any position of
StartG , the set of moves available in G0 and in Gi (and in Gj) are the same. In G0, we let
Eve follow σi as long as the game is in StartG . If the game remains in StartG for ever, the
obtained play is an outcome of σi which is winning for Eve in Gi. Because a position has
the same colour in all games, this play is also winning for Eve in G0. Otherwise, the game
reaches a position of the form vqk. If k 6= 2N + 1, because vqk has been reached by following
σi which is winning in Gi, vqk is a winning position for Eve in Gi. By Point 1 of Lemma 13,
G0, vqk - Gi, vqk, and by Proposition 2 we obtain that Eve also has a winning strategy from
vqk in G0. If k = 2N + 1, because visitσi(y2N+1) = visitσj (y2N+1), σj also visits position
vq2N+1, and therefore it is a winning position for Eve in Gj . Again, by Point 2 of Lemma 13,
G0, vqk - Gj , vqk, and by Proposition 2 Eve also has a winning strategy from vqk in G0. J
5 Conclusions
We have investigated in the expressive power of the epistemic µ-calculus by comparing it with
jumping automata and ATLi. For the first comparison, we have shown that, like in the classic
case, LKµ is expressively equivalent to alternating jumping tree automata. Next, we have shown
that ATLi may express properties not expressible in LKµ , when interpreted with synchronous
perfect-recall semantics. We have also shown that LKµ has a decidable satisfiability problem
when the semantics relies on recognizable relations, i.e. bounded-memory semantics.
From the first two results above, one may prove that the monadic second order logic on
trees, enriched with the equal-level predicate (MSOeqlevel) [19], is strictly more expressive
than LKµ : on the one hand, for each jumping automaton, one may build an equivalent
MSOeqlevel formula, by appropriately encoding Eve’s winning strategies in the automaton.
On the other hand, it is not hard to see that MSOeqlevel may encode any ATLi formula.
These results strengthen the common belief that there exists no “fixpoint” axiomatization
of ATLi, contrary to what is known for ATL with perfect information, where the coalition
operators have fixpoint expansions.
We plan to further investigate the impact of these results on a theory of jumping automata
and their relation with MSO with the equal-level predicate, or other binary predicates. We
conjecture that languages of jumping automata are not closed under existential quantifications.
We also plan to identify a generalization of jumping automata which would be expressively
equivalent (modulo bisimulations) to MSO with additional predicates. On the other hand,
our non-expressiveness proof relies on the synchronous perfect recall setting, and we do not
have an easy generalization to the case of non-synchronous perfect recall semantics, or to
other types of semantics based on non-recognizable indistinguishability relations.
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A Proof of Lemma 13
I Lemma 13.
1. For all q ∈ Q, for k 6= 2N + 1, G0, vqk - Gi, vqk, and
2. for all q ∈ Q, for k 6= 2N + 2, G0, vqk - Gj , vqk.
Proof. For convenience, for v, v′ ∈ V and k ∈ {0, i, j}, we shall write v →k v′ if (v, v′) ∈ Ek.
We start with point 1. Let us define the binary relation Z ⊆ V 0 × V i as the smallest
relation such that, for all q ∈ Q and all α ∈ B+(Dir ×Q):
∀k 6= 2N + 1, ∀x ∈ τ ↓yk , (x, q, α)Z(x, q, α),
∀w ∈ {0, 1}∗, (y2N+1 · w, q, α)Z(yj · w, q, α), and
∀w ∈ {0, 1}∗, (yi · w, q, α)Z(y2N+1 · w, q, α).
We prove that Z is a bisimulation between G0 and Gi. Take (v, v′) ∈ Z. By definition of
Z, v and v′ are on the horizontal line of yk or below. Also, there are x, x′, q and α such that
v = (x, q, α) and v′ = (x′, q, α).
First, for colour harmony: by definition of the colours in acceptance games, it holds that
C(v) = C(q) = C(v′).
Now, for Zig, take u ∈ V such that v →0 u. According to the possible moves in the
semantic games (see Section 2.4), this move is of one of the three following kinds:
1. it decomposes α without moving in the tree nor changing state,
2. it goes down to a child of x in a state q′, or
3. it jumps to a node y such that x; y in a state q′.
Case 1: We have u = (x, q, β), where β is some subformula of α. According to the
definition of semantic games, this move is also possible in Gi: v′ →i u. Therefore, we let
u′ = u. Because we have (x, q, α′)Z(x′, q, α′) for some α′ = α, by definition of Z, it is true
for all α′, and in particular (x, q, β)Z(x′, q, β). Finally, uZu′.
Case 2: We have α = 3q′ or α = q′, u = (y, q′, δ(q′, `0(y))) for some child y of x; write
β := δ(q′, `0(y)) and y := x · c, where c ∈ {0, 1}.
First, observe that by definition of Z, x and x′ are at the same level (|x| = |x′|), and
therefore if x · c exists in τ , so does x′ · c. It follows, by definition of semantic games,
that v′ →i (x′ · c, q′, δ(q′, `i(x′ · c))) is a legal move in Gi; write β′ := δ(q′, `i(x′ · c)) and
u′ := (x′ · c, q′, β′).
We distinguish three possibilities again, according to the definition of Z and the fact that
(x, q, α)Z(x′, q, α).
x = x′. We have y = x · c = x′ · c. By definition of Z, we obtain that y /∈ τ ↓y2N+1 , so that
`0(y) = `i(y). Therefore β = β′, and u = u′, which, by definition of Z, entails that uZu′.
x = y2N+1 ·w for some w. Because vZv′, we have x′ = yj ·w. By observing t0 and ti, we
obtain that `0(y2N+1 ·w · c) = `i(yj ·w · c), so β = β′, and again, by definition of Z, uZu′.
x = yi · w for some w. Because vZv′, we have that x′ = y2N+1 · w. Again, it holds that
`0(yi · w · c) = `i(y2N+1 · w · c), therefore β = β′, and by definition of Z, uZu′.
Case 3: We have α = ; q′ or α = ;q′ for some q′, u = (y, q′, β) for some x ; y and
β = δ(q′, `0(y)). By definition of Z, |x| = |x′|, and because Agent a is blind, the nodes
reachable from x and x′ through ; coincide (they are all the nodes at the same level). We
therefore hace |x| = |x′| = |y|. We distinguish two cases.
y ∈ τ ↓yk for some k 6= 2N + 1: since |x′| = |y|, we have that x′ ; y, and therefore the
move v′ →i (y, q′, δ(q′, `i(y))) = u′ is legal in Gi. Now, because `0(y) = `i(y), u = u′,
hence uZu′.
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y ∈ τ ↓y2N+1 : let y = y2N+1 ·w for some w. We have that |yj ·w| = |y2N+1 ·w| = |y| = |x′|,
hence x′ ; yj · w, and therefore v →i (yj · w, q′, δ(q′, `i(yj · w))) = u′ is a valid move in
Gi. And because `0(y2N+1 · w) = `i(yj · w), δ(q′, `i(yj · w)) = β, and therefore uZu′.
For Zag, the proof is almost the same, making use of the third point in the the definition
of Z instead of the second one for simulating the moves of Gi that jump in τ ↓y2N+1 .
So Z is a bisimulation between G0 and Gi and, clearly, for all q ∈ Q, for k 6= 2N + 1,
(yk, q, δ(q, `(yk)))Z(yk, q, δ(q, `(yk))), i.e. vqkZv
q
k, so that G0, vqk - Gi, vqk.
We turn to the proof of the second point in Lemma 13.
We define the following binary relation Z ′ ⊆ V 0 × V j , very similar to Z, as the smallest
relation such that, for all q ∈ Q and all α ∈ B+(Dir ×Q):
∀k 6= 2N + 1, ∀x ∈ τ ↓yk , (x, q, α)Z ′(x, q, α),
∀w ∈ {0, 1}∗, (y2N+2 · w, q, α)Z ′(yi · w, q, α), and
∀w ∈ {0, 1}∗, (yj · w, q, α)Z ′(y2N+2 · w, q, α).
The only difference is that now, the moves that must be avoided are those that jump in
τ ↓y2N+2 , which is the part that differs between t0 and tj . The rest of the proof is just the
same as for the first point. J
B Proof of Proposition 14
I Proposition 14. Eve has a winning strategy in G0.
Proof. We define a strategy σ0 for Eve in G0, and we prove that it is a winning strategy.
First, for each position of the form vqk, if v
q
k is a winning position for Eve in G0, we pick a
winning strategy for Eve in (G0, vqk) that we call σvqk . Recall that Startτ = {, x1, . . . , x2N+2}
consists in the two first levels of τ , and StartG = {(x, q, α) ∈ V | x ∈ Startτ}. Take a partial
play ρ in G0 ending in a position of Eve.
If ρ ∈ Start∗G , σ0(ρ) := σi(ρ).
Otherwise, there exist ρ′, k, q and ρ′′ such that ρ = ρ′ · vqk · ρ′′ and ρ′ ∈ Start∗G .
If vqk is a winning position for Eve in G0, σvqk is defined, and we let σ0(ρ) := σvqk(v · ρ′′).
Otherwise, define σ0(ρ) arbitrarily.
I Lemma 15. σ0 is winning for Eve in G0.
Let pi ∈ Out(G0, σ0). If pi ∈ StartωG , then pi is also a play in Gi that, moreover, follows σi,
which is winning for Eve in Gi, so pi is winning for Eve in G0 (recall that positions have the
same colours in the different acceptance games). Otherwise, there exist ρ, k, q and pi′ such
that pi = ρ · vqk ·pi′ and ρ ∈ Start∗G . Because ρ · vqk is a partial play in Gi that follows σi, which
is winning for Eve in Gi, vqk is a winning position in Gi. We distinguish two cases.
k 6= 2N + 1: since vqk is a winning position for Eve in Gi, by Lemma 13 and Proposition 2,
vqk is also a winning position for Eve in G0.
k = 2N + 1: necessarily q ∈ visitσi(y2N+1), and because visitσi(y2N+1) = visitσj (y2N+1),
some outcome of σj in Gj visits vqk, which makes vqk a winning position for Eve in Gj .
In both cases, σvq
k
is defined, and by definition of σ0, vqk · pi′ ∈ Out((G0, vqk), σvqk). Because
σvq
k
is winning for Eve in (G0, vqk), vqk · pi′ verifies the parity condition, and therefore also does
pi = ρ · vqk · pi′. So pi is winning for Eve, and we are done. J
